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FINANCING OHIO SUPREME COURT ELECTIONS 1992-
2002: CAMPAIGN FINANCE AND JUDICIAL SELECTION 
Nancy Marion,∗1 Rick Farmer*2 and Todd Moore*3 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
The 2000 Ohio Supreme Court election renewed interest in judicial 
selection reform.1  The election was noted for interest group issue 
advocacy and undisclosed campaign spending.2  Advocacy groups spent 
millions attempting to unseat incumbent Justice Alice Robie Resnick, 
leaving the impression that Ohio justice is controlled by special interests 
 
∗1 Nancy Marion is a Professor of Political Science at the University of Akron.  Her research 
interests revolve around the interplay of politics and criminal justice.  She is the author of six books 
and numerous articles in that area. 
*2 Rick Farmer is Director of Committee Staff at the Oklahoma House of Representatives.  
Formerly, he was Associate Professor of Political Science and a fellow in the Ray C. Bliss Institute 
of Applied Politics at the University of Akron.  Rick is the author of numerous articles on 
campaigns and elections. 
*3 Todd Moore holds a B.A. in History and Political Science from Miami University, Oxford, Ohio, 
and a Master’s of Applied Politics from the Ray C. Bliss Institute of Applied Politics, University of 
Akron.  His research interests include campaign finance, interest groups and elections.  Todd 
previously worked in issue and candidate campaigns and is currently pursuing a doctorate in 
Political Science. 
 1. Ohio’s history concerning judicial selection reform is lengthy.  Numerous attempts have 
been made to change Ohio’s semi-partisan method; the most common approach has been merit 
selection.  The Ohio League of Women Voters challenged an early attempt to reform the method in 
1938.  Further attempts between 1953 and 1979 argued for merit selection method reform.  See 
Richard J. Reubel, Note, Judicial Selection and Tenure—The Merit Plan in Ohio, 42 U. CIN. L. 
REV. 255, 263 (1973); KATHLEEN BARBER, Selection of Ohio Appellate Judges: A Case Study in 
Invisible Politics, in POLITICAL BEHAVIOR AND PUBLIC ISSUES IN OHIO 222-26 (John J. Gargan & 
James G. Coke eds., Kent State Univ. Press 1972); CHARLES H. SHELDON & LINDA S. MAULE, 
CHOOSING JUSTICE (Washington State Univ. Press 1997).  Merit selection reemerged in 1997 as a 
ballot initiative sponsored by the Ohio League of Women Voters and the Ohio State Bar 
Association; Issue 3, the ballot initiative was defeated by a 2:1 margin.  See JOHN FELICE, JOHN 
KILWEIN, & ELIOT SLOTNICK, Judicial Reform in Ohio, in JUDICIAL REFORM IN THE STATES 55, 65 
(Anthony Champagne & Judith Haydel eds., Univ. Press of America 1993). 
 2. See DEBORAH GOLDBERG & SAMANTHA SANCHEZ, THE NEW POLITICS OF JUDICIAL 
ELECTIONS 2002, 15, 33 (Bert Brandenberg, ed., Brennan Center for Justice, Justice at Stake 
Campaign) (Mar. 2004). 
1
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and trial lawyers.3  The uses of negative campaigning and issue 
advocacy seemed to confirm suspicions that the Ohio Supreme Court 
had become dependent on campaign contributions from those with cases 
before the court.  After the election, legal academics and public interest 
organizations began discussing changes to Ohio’s semi-partisan system.4  
Legal scholarship focused on the appearance of corruption and loss of 
judicial independence, and public interest organizations began 
discussing merit selection and campaign finance reform.5 
Ohio’s semi-partisan method is unique in that it elects state 
Supreme Court justices within both partisan and non-partisan electoral 
contexts.6  Candidates campaign during primaries openly displaying 
their partisanship, but during the general election candidates’ 
partisanship is removed and candidates cannot announce their party 
affiliation.  Mixing both partisan and nonpartisan contexts represents an 
 
 3. Stephen Dyer, et al., Dirty Ads Tarnish Judicial Campaigns, AKRON BEACON J., Nov. 25, 
2002, at A1.  See also Kara Baker, Comment Is Justice for Sale in Ohio?  An Examination of Ohio 
Judicial Elections and Suggestions for Reform Focusing on the 2000 Race for the Supreme Court, 
35 AKRON L. REV. 159, 160-66 (2001). 
 4. See, e.g., Baker, supra note 3, at 177-81; David Barnhizer, On the Make: Campaign 
Funding and the Corrupting of the American Judiciary, 50 CATH. U. L. REV. 361, 406, 422-23 
(2001); Paul D. Carrington & Adam R. Long, The Independence and Democratic Accountability of 
the Supreme Court of Ohio, 30 CAP. U. L. REV. 455, 485-87 (2002); Jonathan Entin, Judicial 
Selection and Political Culture, 30 CAP. U. L. REV. 523, 557 (2002); Roy A. Schotland, Financing 
Judicial Elections, 2002: Change and Challenge, 2001 L. REV. M.S.U. - D.C.L. 849, 869-76 
(2001) [hereinafter SCHOTLAND 2001]; Roy A. Schotland, Comment on Professor Carrington’s 
Article, ‘The Independence and Democratic Accountability of the Supreme Court of Ohio,’ 30 CAP. 
U. L. REV. 489 (2002) [hereinafter SCHOTLAND 2002]; Roy A. Schotland, Symposium: Selection of 
State Appellate Judges: Political Party Affiliation in Partisan and Nonpartisan Judicial Elections: 
To the Endangered Species List, Add: Nonpartisan Judicial Elections, 39 WILLAMETTE L. REV. 
1397, 1398 (2003) [hereinafter SCHOTLAND 2003]; Michael E. Solimine, The False Promise of 
Judicial Elections in Ohio, 30 CAP. U. L. REV 559, 562 (2002). 
 5. See supra note 4 (providing examples of such legal scholarship). Public interest 
organizations interested in reforming Ohio’s judicial selection processes and campaign finance 
include: The American Judicature Society at http://www.ajs.org/selection/index.asp; The Brennan 
Center for Law and Policy at http://www. brennancenter.org; The Ray C. Bliss Institute of Applied 
Politics, University of Akron at http://www.uakron.edu/bliss; Justice at Stake Campaign at 
http://www.faircourts.org; Judicial Impartiality: The Next Steps at http://www.thenextsteps.org; 
Ohio League of Woman Voters at http://www.lwvohio.org/map.htm; Ohio Citizen Action at 
http://www.ohiocitizen.org/moneypolitics/mp.html; Ohio State Bar Association at http://www. 
ohiobar.org; The John Glenn Institute for Public Service & Public Policy, Ohio State University at 
http://www.gleeninstitute.org.  These organizations provide information concerning Ohio’s history 
of judicial selection reform and offer policy alternatives to the semi-partisan system.  The websites 
have links to policy papers, money and politics databases, and other campaign finance and state 
court election reform efforts. 
 6. Anthony Champagne & Judith Haydel, JUDICIAL REFORM IN THE STATES (Univ. Press of 
America 1993).  See also Philip L. Dubois, FROM BALLOT TO BENCH (Univ. of Austin Press 1980); 
Henry R. Glick, COURTS, POLITICS, AND JUSTICE (McGraw-Hill 1998); Sheldon & Maule, supra 
note 1. 
2
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attempt to remove partisanship and corruption.7  Additionally, the semi-
partisan system theoretically serves to balance the demands of popular 
democracy against the court’s independence.8 
However, recent legal scholarship has argued that the semi-partisan 
system no longer ensures this balance.9  Scholars are concerned the court 
can no longer remain objective, arguing judicial elections have become 
similar to legislative campaigns.10  Elections require judicial candidates 
to engage in fundraising, seek voter approval and address political issues 
before the court.  Scholars argue elections place inappropriate demands 
on the court by having candidates seek campaign contributions from 
individuals and interest groups that may later expect the court to rule 
based on prior campaign contributions.11  In short, many of these 
scholars argue the semi-partisan method has failed to isolate the court 
from the demands of popular elections.12  Reforming the semi-partisan 
method is viewed as a necessary step to ensure the court’s independence 
and impartiality.13 
 
 7. Kathleen L. Barber, Ohio Judicial Elections: Nonpartisan Premises with Partisan Results, 
32 OHIO ST. L.J. 762, 767-68 (1971).  See also Laurence Baum & Mark Kemper, The Ohio 
Judiciary, in OHIO POLITICS 283-302 (Alexander Lamis, ed., Kent State Univ. Press 1994); 
CHARLES S. LOPEMAN, THE ACTIVIST ADVOCATE: POLICY MAKING IN STATE SUPREME COURTS 62 
(Praeger 1999); Kathleen L. Barber, Judicial Politics in Ohio, in GOVERNMENT AND POLITICS IN 
OHIO 90-92 (Carl Leiberman, ed., Univ. Press of America 1984); ALAN TARR & MARY CORNELIA 
ALDIS PORTER, STATE SUPREME COURTS IN STATE AND NATION 126-127 (Yale Univ. Press 1988). 
 8. See PATRICK M. MCFADDEN, ELECTING JUSTICE: THE LAW AND ETHICS OF JUDICIAL 
ELECTION CAMPAIGNS 5-8 (American Judicature Society 1990). 
 9. See Baker, supra note 3, at 168-75; Solimine, supra note 4, at 560-61, 571-73. 
 10. See Research and Policy Comm., Center for Economic Development, JUSTICE FOR HIRE: 
IMPROVING JUDICIAL SELECTION, 11-12 (2002), available at http://www.ced.org/ 
docs/report/report_ judicial.pdf [hereinafter JUSTICE FOR HIRE].  See also Doug Oplinger, Supreme 
Court Races Less Dirty, Still Feisty, AKRON BEACON J., Oct. 11, 2004, at A1. 
 11. See Barnhizer, supra note 4, at 364-66; SCHOTLAND 2001, supra note 4, at 851, 857. 
 12. See Barnhizer, supra note 4, at 364-66; SCHOTLAND 2001, supra note 4, at 851, 857. 
 13. See Carrington & Long, supra note 4, at 471, 482.  The terms ‘independence’ and 
‘impartiality’ are used with imprecision.  Id.  The U.S. Supreme Court has discussed the vague 
nature of these terms within Republican Party of Minn. v. White, 536 U.S. 765 (2002).  According 
to Alexander Hamilton, “[t]he complete independence of the courts of justice is peculiarly essential 
in a limited Constitution.”  THE FEDERALIST NO. 78, at 466 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter 
ed. 1961).  Here Hamilton used the term within a separation of powers context.  Id.  But Hamilton 
later used the term within a different context.  When he  argued: “[i]f, then, the courts of justice are 
to be considered as the bulwarks of a limited constitution against legislative encroachment, this 
consideration will afford a strong argument for the permanent tenure of judicial offices, since 
nothing will contribute so much as this to that independent spirit in the judges. . . .”  Id. at 469. 
  Hamilton also commented on judicial impartiality, attempting to persuade New York that 
life tenure on the court provides impartiality: 
To avoid arbitrary discretion in the courts, it is indispensable that they [judges] should be 
bound down by strict rules and precedents, which serve to define and point out their duty 
in every particular case that comes before them . . . [t]he records of those precedents 
3
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must unavoidably swell to a very considerable bulk and must demand long and laborious 
study to acquire a competent knowledge of them. . . .  [A] temporary duration in office 
will naturally discourage such characters from quitting a lucrative line of practice to 
accept a seat on the bench . . . . 
Id. at 471. 
Reading the passage, contradictory interpretations of judicial impartiality emerge.  Hamilton 
attempts to persuade that both judges and the court are impartial. THE FEDERALIST NO. 78, at 471.  
The United States Supreme Court recently argued that the term ‘judicial impartiality’ is overly 
broad and uncertain.  See White, 536 U.S. 765, 775-780 (2002).  Justice Scalia argued the term was 
ambiguous as a justification for limiting speech, stating that the various meanings of impartiality 
include: (1) the lack of bias for or against either party to the proceeding; (2) lack of preconception in 
favor of or against a particular view; or (3) open-mindedness.  Id. at 775, 777-78.  This laborious 
passage concerning the terms “judicial independence and impartiality” is intended to demonstrate 
the misuse of the terms and why the terms obfuscate the judicial selection debate. 
See also Bradley Link, Note, Had Enough in Ohio? Time to Reform Ohio’s Judicial 
Selection Process, 51 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 123 (2004).  Link argues that “[o]ur legal system rests on 
the fundamental idea that judges will serve as independent and un-biased arbiters of the law.  
Unfortunately, the current model for selecting judges in Ohio through non-partisan elections falls 
far short of the mark. . . .”  Id. at 124.  Link also argues the semi-partisan system has several 
“pitfalls”.  According to Link: 
Our system of electing judges has several negative effects: (1) election of judges gives 
the appearance that the judiciary will be unable to act with the independence and 
impartiality necessary for the proper; (2) election of judges undermines the public 
confidence in the judiciary; and (3) election of judges may discourage qualified 
candidates from seeking the bench. 
Id. at 126.  Link concluded that “Ohio needs to make the radical change to an appointive method of 
selecting judges. . .to shore up public confidence in the judiciary and ensure the integrity and 
impartiality of the courts.”  Id. at 152. 
See also Jeffery W. Stempel, Malignant Democracy: Core Fallacies Underlying Election of 
the Judiciary, 4 NEV. L.J. 35 (2003).  Stempel’s article does not critique semi-partisan elections 
specifically.  However, the article argues against judicial elections and calls for judicial selection 
reform.  According to Stempel: 
When the judiciary is chosen through rough-and-tumble elections, we have hyper-
democracy that has become cancerous and perhaps metastasized so as to infect the 
judiciary adversely in ways beyond the selection process itself.  Although my metaphor 
is perhaps hyperbolic, is it instructive and, in my view correct.  With so much 
electioneering over so many offices which voters know so little, we have created a status 
quo that consumes public resources wastefully (e.g. more money spent on election 
administration and verification; more money spent on media, much of it merely negative 
rather than informative) for relatively little improvement in civic virtue. 
Id. at 50. 
See also David Goldberger, The Power of Special Interest Groups to Overwhelm Judicial 
Election Campaigns: The Troublesome Interaction Between the Code of Judicial Conduct, 
Campaign Finance Laws, and the First Amendment,  72 U. CIN. L. REV. 1 (2003).  Goldberger 
argues that “[t]he widespread use of judicial elections to select state court judges continues to create 
a serious tension between our respect for elections as preferred mechanism to select our state court 
judges and our desire to have judges who are sufficiently removed from politics to be fair and 
impartial decisionmakers.”  Id. at 1. 
See also Lawrence Baum, Perspectives on Judicial Independence: Judicial Elections and 
Judicial Independence: The Voter’s Perspective, 64 OHIO ST. L.J. 13 (2003).  Baum’s research 
addresses voter perception of judicial independence.  He argues state court elections have remained 
relatively low information level campaigns, stating that, “[l]acking much information, voters 
4
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Numerous publications and policy discussions have focused on the 
perceived failures of Ohio’s semi-partisan system and campaign finance 
law.14  For example, Ohio State University’s John Glenn Institute for 
Public Service and Public Policy, while not arguing explicitly that 
interest group contributions undermine the court, does support judicial 
selection reform due to fears that interest group issue-advocacy 
campaigns threaten judicial independence and impartiality.15  In 
addition, The Brennan Center for Justice, Justice at Stake Campaign, 
Bliss Institute of Applied Politics, Ohio League of Women Voters, Ohio 
State Bar Association and Ohio Chief Justice Thomas Moyer assembled 
a judicial conference, “Judicial Impartiality: The Next Steps,” addressing 
 
frequently decline to choose between judicial candidates.  When they do make a choice, they base 
that choice on the scraps of information they do hold, primarily information they glean from the 
ballot.”  Id. at 38.  Baum also suggests that state supreme court races have departed somewhat from 
the low-information model with the rise of issue campaigns in supreme court elections: 
The proportion of judicial contests that depart from the low-information model surely 
has increased over the last two decades. . . it has been concentrated at the state supreme 
court level. . . . Has judicial independence declined? For state supreme court justices, 
almost certainly it has.  Justices are now more likely to face strong opposition campaigns 
that are based in large part on their judicial votes and opinions. . . . 
Id. at 39.  Baum concludes by arguing that the perception that judicial independence is threatened is 
an exaggeration: “the effect of this trend on judges’ perceptions of their independence undoubtedly 
is substantial.  Large-scale campaigns against incumbent judges that achieve success or come close 
to it are vivid events.  Like other vivid events, they are likely to be exaggerated by observers. . . .”  
Id. at 39. 
 14. According to the ABA Justice in Jeopardy report, elections are creating a contributions 
“arms race.”  American Bar Association, Justice in Jeopardy: Report of the American Bar 
Association Commission on the Twenty-First Century Judiciary 79 (2003) available at 
http://www.abanet.org/barserv/library/n/judiciary_and_the_courts/4543.pdf [hereinafter ABA 
REPORT].  According to the report, justices become dependent on campaign contributions from 
those who contribute—thereby destroying the courts’ independence and impartiality.  Id. at 15-16.  
The report argues judicial candidates solicit contributions from individuals and interest groups who 
have issues before the court creating the appearance of impropriety.  Id. at Appendix A, p. 24.  The 
nonprofit Center for Economic Development (CED) argues justices sell their decisions, depicting 
“Justice for Hire” and picturing dollar signs above the court.  JUSTICE FOR HIRE, supra note 10.  The 
report argues, “. . . elections are an inappropriate and detrimental method of selecting judges.”  Id. at 
4.  The CED report concludes rising campaign costs are making justices dependent on interest group 
contributions.  Id. at 6. 
 15. See Deborah Merritt, Judicial Campaign Reform Deserves Public Support, The John 
Glenn Institute for Public Service and Public Policy, Press Release, January, 13 (2004), available at 
http://www.thenextsteps.org/judicial_reform.pdf.  Merritt, an Ohio State law professor, wrote the 
press release for the Institute stating the Institute’s concerns with interest group issue advocacy and 
judicial selection reform.  According to Merritt: 
Recent judicial elections are not what the framers of the [Ohio] 1851 constitution had in 
mind.  In the 2000 Supreme Court race, a secretly funded ‘issue-advocacy’ organization 
ran unfair ads . . . and alleg[ed] . . . judicial votes were for sale. . . .  Public confidence in 
the judiciary has fallen[,] . . . voters believe judges are tied to campaign contributors, and 
qualified candidates don’t want to subject themselves to malicious attacks. 
Id. at 1. 
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options for regulating campaign contributions and judicial elections.16  
Recently, national attention addressing state judicial selection and 
campaign finance reform has criticized elections as a means of ensuring 
judicial independence.17  The American Bar Association (ABA) Justice 
in Jeopardy report criticizes elections as a means of judicial selection, 
arguing elections produce highly politicized political environments that 
are contrary to the nature of judicial office.18  The ABA argues that 
courts are unique within the separate branches of government and that 
courts are assumed non-political institutions.19  It supports replacing 
elections with a commission-based appointive method that removes the 
court from the political process.20  Ohio lawmakers have noted the ABA 
proposals and have begun drafting legislation that will alter Ohio’s semi-
partisan system.21 
Much of the debate concerning judicial selection reform rests on 
assumptions about money.22  But little is known about the precise way 
 
 16. See Judicial Independence and Impartiality: The Next Steps, A Progress Report (2004), 
available at http://www.thenextsteps.org/NextStepsProgressReport.pdf (addressing policy options 
for regulating campaign contributions and judicial selection reform).  The report calls for several 
judicial selection and campaign finance related reforms, including extended supreme court terms, 
changing judicial qualifications, judicial compensation, campaign finance disclosure and voter 
education guides.  Id. at 3-6. 
 17. GOLDBERG & SANCHEZ, supra note 2, at 5. 
 18. ABA REPORT, supra note 14, at 24. 
 19. ABA REPORT, supra note 14, at 18-19. 
 20. The ABA has long advocated merit selection methods.  See ABA REPORT, supra note 14, 
at v. The most recent ABA recommendation suggests gubernatorial appointment.  Id.  The ABA 
argues gubernatorial appointment will bring the most qualified gubernatorial candidates to the 
bench and improve the quality of courts. Id. at 52.  Empirical studies demonstrate judicial selection 
methods do not determine the quality of judicial candidates or quality of decisions produced by 
courts.  According to Melinda Gann Hall: 
Empirical research on the effects of judicial selection processes has been quite consistent 
in finding that methods of judicial recruitment do not affect either the quality of the 
bench or judicial outcomes.  Earlier studies, as well as more recent work, all determine 
that background characteristics of judges are similar regardless of method of judicial 
selection.  Likewise, studies demonstrate selection methods do not affect the tendency 
for state supreme courts to rule in favor of particular categories of litigants.  Based on the 
evidence to date, the conclusion reasonably could be drawn that selection mechanisms 
simply do not have much of an impact on the operation of state judiciaries. 
Melinda Gann Hall, Electoral Politics and Strategic Voting in State Supreme Courts, 54 J. POL. 427, 
428 (1992). 
 21. Following the 2000 election, several bills were introduced to change issue advocacy 
campaigns, including The Taft-Blackwell Campaign Finance Reform Bill (S.B. 10, 2003) and 
“Electioneering Communications,” S.B. 214 and Sub. S.B. 214 (2003-2004). 
 22. Ohio’s judicial selection debate concerns two competing selection theories.  The public 
good theory argues elections do not ensure democratic accountability.  See DAVID W. ADAMANY & 
GEORGE E. AGREE, POLITICAL MONEY (Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins Univ. Press 1975); OWEN 
M. FISS, THE IRONY OF FREE SPEECH (Harvard Univ. Press 1996); Edward Foley, Equal-Dollars-
6
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Ohio Supreme Court elections are financed.  While numerous studies 
address the semi-partisan system as an electoral method, few studies 
address campaign finance specifically.23  To date there has been little 
academic research on judicial campaign finance in Ohio.  The current 
research examines many assumptions underlying Ohio’s method of 
judicial selection and related campaign finance system. 
II.  BACKGROUND 
A.  Explaining Semi-Partisan Electoral Outcomes 
The semi-partisan method employed in Ohio is known for 
producing partisan campaigning.24  Electoral outcomes can be explained 
as partisan contests conducted through the activities of candidates, 
political parties and interest groups.  Political science literature 
recognizes political parties, interest groups, incumbency, candidate 
 
Per-Voter: A Constitutional Principle of Campaign Finance, 94 COLUM. L. REV. 1204 (1994); 
Richard L. Hasen, Clipping Coupons for Democracy: An Egalitarian/Public Choice Defense of 
Campaign Finance Vouchers, 84 CAL. L. REV. 1 (1996); Richard L. Hasen, Campaign Finance 
Laws and the Rupert Murdoch Problem, 77 TEXAS L. REV. 1627 (1999); Bert Neuborne, Is Money 
Different?, 77 TEX. L. REV.1609 (1999); Jamin Raskin & Jon Bonifaz, Equal Protection and the 
Wealth Primary, 11 YALE LAW & POL. REV. 273 (1993); Cass R. Sunstein, Political Equality and 
Unintended Consequences, 94 COLUM. L. REV. 1390 (1994); Fred Wertheimer & Susan Weiss 
Manes, Campaign Finance Reform: A Key to Restoring the Health of Our Democracy, 94 COLUM. 
L. REV. 1126 (1994).  This view contends elections undermine democratic accountability by 
bringing money into the political process; money undermines democratic equality; unequal policy 
reflects the views of elites.  The constitutional rights view argues elections provide democratic 
accountability by promoting speech within the First Amendment.  See, e.g., Mitch McConnell, In 
Defense of Soft Money, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 1, 2001, at A 17; Bradley A. Smith, Money Talks: Speech, 
Corruption, Equality, and Campaign Finance, 86 GEO. L. J. 45 (1997); Bradley A. Smith, Soft 
Money, Hard Realities: The Constitutional Prohibition of a Soft Money Ban, 24 J. LEGIS. 179-200 
(1998); Bradley A. Smith, The Sirens’ Song: Campaign Finance Regulation and the First 
Amendment, 6 J.L. & POL’Y 1 (1999); BRADLEY A. SMITH, UNFREE SPEECH: THE FOLLY OF 
CAMPAIGN FINANCE REFORM (Princeton Univ. Press 2001).  This view argues campaign finance 
reform limits speech by limiting contributions; regulating money regulates political expression.  The 
Ohio reform debate adheres to public good theory: critics argue semi-partisan elections create 
expensive general election campaigns, increase interest group activity and threaten judicial 
independence and impartiality. 
 23. DUBOIS, supra note 6, at 242-43.  See also Phillip L. DuBois, Penny for Your Thoughts? 
Campaign Spending in Trail Court Elections, 1976-1982, 39 W. POL. Q. 265, 266 (1986); Mary L. 
Volcansek, An Exploration of the Judicial Election Process, 34 W. POL. Q. 572, 577 (1981); Susan 
Welch & Timothy Bledsoe, The Partisan Consequences of Nonpartisan Elections and the Changing 
Nature of Urban Politics, 30 AM. J. POL. SCI. 128, 128 (1986). 
 24. See Barber, supra note 7, at 774, 783-84; BAUM & KEMPER, supra note 7, at 288; Welch 
& Bledsoe, supra note 23; Melinda Gann Hall, State Judicial Politics: Rules, Structures, and the 
Political Game, AMERICAN STATE AND LOCAL POLITICS 114-139 (Ronald E. Weber & Paul Brace, 
eds.) (Chatham House Publishers 1999). 
7
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quality and money as explanatory variables affecting electoral 
outcomes.25  These will all be examined here. 
B.  Political Parties 
Political parties affect electoral outcomes by influencing the 
amount of information voters have about the candidates.  Political 
parties educate voters about judicial candidates’ partisanship through 
voter slate cards and related campaign brochures.26  Party campaign 
literature increases partisan awareness and information levels about 
judicial candidates by making party identification an information cue 
that helps voters choose within the semi-partisan method.27 
Political parties also influence electoral outcomes through 
campaign contributions and related campaign expenditures.28  Political 
parties provide campaign contributions to judicial candidates and are 
noted for campaign expenditures through television media, get-out-the-
vote activities and direct mail.29  Previous scholarship is limited 
concerning how political parties contribute to judicial candidates within 
different electoral contexts.30 
C.  Interest Groups 
In recent years, issue concerns such as education and tort reform 
have brought interest groups into judicial elections.31  However, interest 
 
 25. See Laurence Baum, The Electoral Fates of Incumbent Judges in the Ohio Court of 
Common Pleas, 66 JUDICATURE 420 (1983) [hereinafter BAUM 1983]; Lawrence Baum, Explaining 
the Vote in Judicial Elections: The 1984 Ohio Supreme Court Elections, 40 W. POL. Q., 361, 367 
(1987) [hereinafter BAUM 1987]. 
 26. See, e.g., JOHN F. BIBBY, POLITICS, PARTIES, AND ELECTIONS IN AMERICA (4th ed. 
Wadsworth 2000); DANIEL M. SHEA & MICHAEL JOHN BURTON, CAMPAIGN CRAFT: THE 
STRATEGIES, TACTICS, AND ART OF POLITICAL CAMPAIGN MANAGEMENT (Praeger 2001); FRANK J. 
SORAUF, INSIDE CAMPAIGN FINANCE (Yale Univ. Press 1992). 
 27. See, e.g., Marie Hojanacki & Lawrence Baum, “New Style” Judicial Campaigns and the 
Voters: Economic Issues and Union Members in Ohio, 45 W. POL. Q. 921, 944 (1992); Peverill 
Squire & Eric R.A.N. Smith, The Effect of Partisan Information on Voters in Nonpartisan Elections, 
50 J. POL. 169, 171 (1988).  See also BAUM 1983, supra note 25, at 427-29; BAUM 1987, supra note 
25, at 365, 368. 
 28. See MALCOLM E. JEWELL & SARAH M. MOREHOUSE, POLITICAL PARTIES AND 
ELECTIONS IN AMERICAN STATES (CQ Press 2001).  See also MICHAEL J. MALBIN & THOMAS L. 
GAIS, THE DAY AFTER REFORM: SOBERING CAMPAIGN FINANCE LESSONS FROM THE AMERICAN 
STATES (The Rockefeller Institute Press 1998); Shea & Burton, supra note 26. 
 29. See DUBOIS, supra note 6, at 40; MALBIN & GAIS, supra note 28. 
 30. See MALBIN & GAIS, supra note 28, at 105-109. 
 31. Paul R. Brace & Melinda Gann Hall, The Interplay of Preferences, Case Facts, Context, 
and Rules in the Politics of Judicial Choice, 59 J. POL. 1206 (1997).  See also Hojanacki & Baum, 
supra note 27, at 921.  According to Baum, “[e]lectoral campaigns for judgeships. . .typically have 
8
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groups have a more lengthy history of campaigning on behalf of judicial 
candidates.32  Interest groups support candidates that share an 
organization’s partisan and ideological perspectives: Republican interest 
groups generally represent business, agriculture and medicine; 
Democratic interest groups generally represent labor, education and 
public interest advocacy.33  Interest groups affect electoral outcomes by 
endorsing judicial candidates and participating in direct mail and 
television media campaigns.  Political science literature demonstrates 
that interest group campaigning increases voter information levels much 
like the effects of political parties; the partisan information voters learn 
through interest group literature increases voters’ partisan awareness of 
judicial candidates.34 
Interest groups also affect electoral outcomes by contributing 
campaign funds to judicial candidates.35  Interest groups actively raise 
and contribute campaign funds within the semi-partisan system.36  
Critics argue interest group contributions threaten the court’s 
impartiality and claim candidates’ campaigns are funded 
disproportionately through interest group contributions.37  Empirical 
 
been small in scale, low-key, and devoid of issue content. Over the past decade, however, an 
increasing number of campaigns have diverged from this traditional pattern. . . .”  Id.  He added that 
“judicial elections feature substantial campaigns and significant attention from the mass media.  
Further, candidates and other participants are increasingly willing to inject policy issues into 
campaigns.  This new development is what we have come to call ‘new-style’ judicial contests.”  Id. 
at 922 (internal citations omitted). 
 32. See JUSTICE FOR HIRE, supra note 10, at 17-20; ABA REPORT, supra note 14, at 18. 
 33. See JEFFERY M. BERRY, THE INTEREST GROUP SOCIETY 136-137 (2d ed. 1997).  See also 
BAUM & KEMPER, supra note 7, at 292. 
 34. See BERRY, supra note 33, at 105-110; Brace & Hall, supra note 31, at 1213-16; JOHN R. 
WRIGHT, INTEREST GROUPS AND CONGRESS: LOBBYING, CONTRIBUTIONS, AND INFLUENCE 90-91 
(Allyn and Bacon 1996). 
 35. MALBIN & GAIS, supra note 28, at 77-103. 
 36. BAUM & KEMPER, supra note 7, at 299. 
 37. SCHOTLAND 2001, supra note 4, at 880.  Judicial scholar Roy A. Schotland is particularly 
critical of Ohio elections.  Schotland contends receiving contributions from interest groups that have 
interests before the court, undermines the courts impartiality.  See id.  Schotland reasons elections 
make justices dependent on campaign contributions: contributions mean justices have to appeal to 
those giving the contributions; the process weakens impartiality.  Id.  According to Schotland, “[t]he 
judge’s obligation is completely at odds with seeking the support of organized groups that have 
clear goals for what they want government to do or refrain from doing.”  Id. at 860. 
Other scholars have made more aggressive claims concerning campaign contributions.  
Cleveland-Marshall law professor David Barnhizer argues the corruption of courts is deliberate, 
stating that “[t]he corruption of the judiciary includes deliberate judicial wrongdoing in exchange 
for financial contributions. . . .  [It] involves subtle judicial behavior shaped to fit contributors’ 
agendas. . . .  [E]ven if judicial corruption through decisions that favor special interest is not 
empirically demonstrable. . . .”  Barnhizer, supra note 4, at 366.  Barnhizer adds that, “[o]ne 
consequence of the rising cost of judicial elections and the amassing of large pools of campaign 
9
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research is limited concerning how interest groups contribute to judicial 
candidates within different electoral contexts.38 
D.  Incumbency 
Perhaps the most notable characteristic within the semi-partisan 
system is the effect of incumbency.  Political science research 
consistently finds incumbency produces an electoral advantage.39  
Incumbents rarely lose under the semi-partisan system even when faced 
with competitive challenger campaigns.40  This is because incumbency 
often provides voters with partisan information cues based on previous 
vote choice.41 
Previous scholarship has also noted that incumbents consistently 
outspend challengers.42  Because incumbents rarely lose and have 
established a judicial record, incumbents easily attract campaign 
contributions.43  Critics argue incumbents excessively campaign to raise 
 
funds by special interests is that many judicial candidates are consciously and unconsciously selling 
their votes on issues . . . [, and] candidates are willing to provide what the donors want in exchange 
for their money.”  Id. at 364. 
Professor Paul Carrington argues contributions and the role of interest group campaigning 
undermines the Court’s independence and accountability.  Carrington & Long, supra note 4, at 472-
73.  According to Carrington: 
The Supreme Court of Ohio . . . is in a crisis resulting from an unseemly flood of money 
into statewide judicial election campaigns . . . .  The expensiveness of media campaigns 
has the dramatic effect of forcing not only judicial candidates but sitting judges hoping 
for re-election to seek and accumulate large campaign war chests.  Often lawyers and 
litigants who are likely to appear before the judge constitute large proportions of the 
contributions. . . . 
Id. at 455, 474.  Carrington later commented that, “[a]t best, campaign fundraising by judicial 
candidates is unseemly and degrading.  At worst, it tempts those with an interest in a state’s law to 
try to buy a high court.”  Id. at 474. 
 38. See e.g. BAUM & KEMPER, supra note 7, at 303-330 (demonstrating the lack of empirical 
data on interest group influence on judicial campaigns by way of an entire chapter devoted to 
lobbying and interests that does not refer to the judiciary once). 
 39. See, e.g., Barber, supra note 7, at 768; BAUM 1983, supra note 25, at 422-23; BAUM & 
KEMPER, supra note 7, at 288; CARL LIEBERMAN, GOVERNMENT AND POLITICS IN OHIO (Univ. 
Press of America 1984). 
 40. BAUM 1983, supra note 25.  See also BAUM 1987, supra note 25. 
 41. See BAUM 1983, supra note 25; BAUM 1987, supra note 25; Hojanacki & Baum, supra 
note 27. 
 42. See GARY C. JACOBSON, MONEY IN CONGRESSIONAL ELECTIONS, 105-110 (Yale Univ. 
Press 1980) [hereinafter JACOBSON 1980]; Gary Jacobson, The Effects of Campaign Spending in 
House Elections: New Evidence for Old Arguments, 34 AM. J. POL. SCI. 334  [hereinafter EFFECTS 
OF CAMPAIGN SPENDING]; Robert K. Goidel & Donald A. Gross, Reconsidering the ‘Myths and 
Realities’ of Campaign Finance Reform,  21 LEG. STUDIES Q. 129 (1996); Donald Philip Green & 
Jonathon S. Krasno, Salvation for the Spendthrift Incumbent: Reestimating the Effects of Campaign 
Spending In House Elections, 32 AM. J. POL. SCI. 884 (1988). 
 43. See JACOBSON 1980, supra note 42, at 113 (noting the incumbent advantage as manifested 
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campaign funds under the semi-partisan system and argue incumbents 
are dependent on interest group contributions.44  Literature is limited 
concerning how the semi-partisan method affects incumbents’ 
fundraising demands. 
E.  Candidate Quality 
Political science research demonstrates that candidate quality 
affects electoral outcomes by increasing electoral competition.45  The 
semi-partisan method generally produces quality candidates for the 
court.46  Candidate quality is often a measure of previous experience and 
accomplishment; moreover, quality candidates attract media attention 
and interest group endorsements.47 
Candidate quality is also recognized to affect interest group and 
political party behavior.  Challengers demonstrating an ability to raise 
campaign contributions generally attract interest group and political 
party contributions.48  Critics argue the semi-partisan method 
discourages quality challengers, claiming the most qualified candidates 
do not run because of the demands of fundraising.49  Political science 
literature has found that candidate quality affects challengers’ ability to 
raise campaign funds.50  Yet, previous literature is limited concerning 
how candidate quality affects electoral competitiveness within the semi-
partisan system. 
F.  Money 
Political science literature consistently finds that money does not 
win elections.51  However, the perception persists despite decades of 
campaign finance research.  Political science scholarship demonstrates 
that when money is used as an explanatory variable, the relationship is 
relatively weak in explaining electoral outcomes.52  Instead, other 
 
in Congressional elections). 
 44. See Barnhizer, supra note 4, at 378, 392; SCHOTLAND 2001, supra note 4, at 890-93. 
 45. See JACOBSON 1980, supra note 42, at 106; Green & Krasno, supra note 42, at 891, 898. 
 46. See BAUM & KEMPER, supra note 7, at 285; LIEBERMAN, supra note 39, at 90. 
 47. See BAUM & KEMPER, supra note 7, at 285-87. 
 48. BAUM & KEMPER, supra note 7, at 287.  See also DUBOIS, supra note 6, at 6-8. 
 49. See, e.g., Solimine, supra note 4, at 568-69. 
 50. See, e.g., DUBOIS, supra note 6, at 6-19; JACOBSON 1980, supra note 42, at 106. 
 51. See, e.g., ANTHONY CORRADO, ET AL., CAMPAIGN FINANCE REFORM: A SOURCEBOOK 
(Brookings Institution Press 1997); ANTHONY CORRADO, CAMPAIGN FINANCE REFORM (The 
Century Foundation Press 2000); ANTHONY CORRADO, ET AL., INSIDE THE CAMPAIGN FINANCE 
BATTLE (Brookings Institution Press 2003). 
 52. See generally, Jacobson, supra note 42, at 105-6; Green & Krasno, supra note 42, at 884-
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explanatory variables such as incumbency and party affiliation are more 
predictive within the semi-partisan system.53 
Yet there is no other explanatory variable that is so widely 
discussed and so inadequately explained within judicial selection reform 
as money.54  Critics are concerned that judicial campaign costs are 
increasing judicial candidates’ reliance on interest group contributions.55  
Previous research is limited concerning campaign contributions to 
judicial candidates from individuals, interest groups and political parties 
and how campaign expenditures affect semi-partisan electoral outcomes. 
G.  Current Study 
The current study examines Ohio’s semi-partisan judicial electoral 
system by evaluating contributions and expenditures data.  The research 
describes and explains the effects of money and how judicial campaign 
finance operates within the semi-partisan system during the 1992–2002 
Ohio Supreme Court elections.56  It examines incumbent and challenger 
contribution patterns; contributions from individuals, interest groups and 
political parties; and candidates’ expenditures within incumbent, 
challenger and open seat electoral contexts.  The study also evaluates the 
effects of candidate quality, interest group endorsements, and bar ratings 
within the semi-partisan system during the 1982 – 2002 elections.57 
 
5; and Goidel & Gross, supra note 42, at 142-5.  The campaign finance literature finds that, once 
candidates reach a competitive spending threshold, money becomes less predictive in explaining 
electoral outcomes.  See Jacobson, supra note 42, at 105.  This idea is fundamental to understanding 
the campaign finance literature.  When candidates are competitive, other campaign-related factors 
(e.g. incumbency, candidate quality) become more predictive.  But, as Jacobson argues, independent 
variables such as candidate quality and incumbency often become “mutually reinforcing variables.”  
See Jacobson, supra note 43, at 106. 
 53. See Robert S. Erikson & Thomas Palfrey, Campaign Spending and Incumbency: An 
Alternative Simultaneous Equations Approach, 60 J. POL. 355 (1998); JACOBSON 1980, supra note 
42, at 136-62; EFFECTS OF CAMPAIGN SPENDING, supra note 42, at 357; Green & Krasno, supra 
note 42, at 884-85. 
 54. See Carrington & Long, supra note 4, at 474; MCFADDEN, supra note 8, at 25-27; 
SCHOTLAND 2001, supra note 4; SCHOTLAND 2002, supra note 4; SCHOTLAND 2003, supra note 4. 
 55. See ABA Report, supra note 14, at 22-25. 
 56. The contributions and expenditures data represents elections for Associate Justice and 
does not include data for Chief Justice. 
 57. The research incorporates two different data sets: (1) campaign contributions and 
expenditures data obtained through the Ohio Secretary of State (1992-2002); and (2) interest group 
endorsement data from the labor union AFSCME and candidate quality data from the Ohio State 
Bar Association ratings (1982-2002).  The campaign contribution and expenditure data is not 
complete from the Ohio Secretary of State and therefore earlier data could not be obtained in 
electronic data form.  Using the AFSCME and Ohio Bar Association ratings were readily available 
and used as a preliminary analysis of the effects of interest group endorsements and bar ratings as 
explanatory variables.  The current research uses descriptive statistics which limits the predictive 
12
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The current research addresses campaign finance questions 
commonly affirmed within judicial selection literature.  The most 
persistent questions concern the effects of semi-partisan elections on 
judicial candidates, the effects of contributions from individuals, interest 
groups and political parties and the effects of judicial candidates’ 
campaign expenditures.  The study uses descriptive statistics to evaluate 
current assumptions underlying the judicial selection debate.58 
H.  Data Collection 
The contribution and expenditure data used within the current 
research were collected using public records filed with the Ohio 
Secretary of State.  The contribution and expenditure data represent 
twelve Ohio Supreme Court races during the period of 1992-2002 within 
incumbent, challenger and open seat electoral contexts.  General election 
vote totals were also obtained through the Ohio Secretary of State’s 
election archive. 
Currently, independent expenditures by interest groups and parties 
are not reported to the Secretary of State’s office.  The use of 
independent expenditures in the 2000 campaign heightened concern over 
judicial independence and reinforced public perceptions that campaign 
contributions from interest groups unduly influences the court.59  
Unfortunately, independent expenditures cannot be analyzed here due to 
the lack of available data. 
Candidate quality data were provided by the Ohio Bar Association, 
which rated judicial candidates using scaled measures of judicial 
qualifications from highly qualified to unqualified.  Interest group 
endorsements were collected through the American Federation of State, 
 
qualities of the data.  Future studies may incorporate interest group endorsements and bar ratings 
into regression models. 
 58. This research uses an inductive research design and descriptive statistics.  The purpose of 
descriptive statistics is to formulate generalizations by describing and explaining political events.  
Descriptive statistics will help clarify the judicial selection debate by demonstrating how 
contributions and expenditures operate within Ohio Supreme Court elections.  According to Sidney 
Verba, et. al: 
Description and explanation both depend upon rules of scientific inference. . . .  There 
are several fundamental aspects of scientific description. One is that it involves 
inference: part of the descriptive task is to infer information about unobserved facts from 
the facts we have observed.  Another aspect involves distinguishing between that which 
is systematic about the observed facts and that which is nonsystematic. 
Gary King, et al., Designing Social Inquiry: Scientific Inference in Qualitative Research 34 
(Princeton Univ. Press 1994). 
 59. See Barnhizer, supra note 4, at 364; Carrington & Long, supra note 4, at 479; 
SCHOTLAND 2003, supra note 4, at 1423. 
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County and Municipal Employees (AFSCME).  These endorsements are 
used to evaluate the effect of interest group support within the semi-
partisan method.  Party affiliation, AFSCME endorsements, ABA 
ratings and incumbency data are examined through twenty-six Ohio 
Supreme Court elections from 1982-2002. 
III.  DATA ANALYSIS 
A.  Incumbents’ Time Raising Campaign Contributions 
 
The semi-partisan method has been criticized as placing excessive 
fundraising burdens on judicial candidates.60  The data in Table 1 display 
incumbents’ contributions during 1992-2002.  The contribution data 
represent total yearly contributions.  The data reveal that incumbent 
justices do not raise contributions during non-election years.  Justice 
Resnick and Justice Pfeifer are the only exceptions to these findings.  
Only Justice Resnick raised significant money in the year prior to the 
election. 
Table 1: Contributions Raised by Incumbents During Election Terms 
  RESNICK DOUGLAS SWEENEY PFEIFER COOK STRATTON 
1992 123      
1993 91      
1994 732,002      
1995 5,914      
1996 1,927 441,582     
1997 1,667 226 50 29,885   
1998 999  536,554 575,847   
1999 245,964   27,713 68,475  
2000 238,610   17,664 919,702  
2001 9,897   11,891  154 
2002 3,903   4,569  1,901,801 
     Note:  Incumbent Re-election years are in bold print. 
     Note:  Incumbents were re-elected in every election from 1992-2002. 
 
 60. Those concerned with judicial selection often characterize elections as discouraging 
judicial candidates from running for office.  A common argument is qualified judicial candidates do 
not run because of the fundraising demands of running for office.  See, e.g., Link, supra note 13, at 
131-2; Stempel, supra note 13, at 48-9. 
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B.  Challengers’ Time Raising Campaign Contributions 
Challengers also allocate limited time to raising campaign 
contributions.  In other words, challengers do not raise money during 
non-election years.  The data in Table 2 represent total yearly 
contributions raised by challengers.  The data reveal challengers 
contributions are increasing since the 2000 elections.  Prior to 2000, the 
highest contributions raised were $276,196; since 2000, challengers have 
raised over $1 million.  The data reveal challengers’ campaign 
contributions are representative of the ability of challengers to win 
within the semi-partisan system. 
 
 Table 2: Contributions Raised by Challengers During Election Years  
  HARPER SIKORA POWELL SUSTER BLACK ODONNELL BURNSIDE 
1992               
1993               
1994 249900             
1995               
1996   34803           
1997   325           
1998     260322 276196       
1999     188 9492 405 7111   
2000         694394 1016426   
2001               
2002             1193733 
 
C.  Open Seat Candidates’ Time Raising Campaign Contributions 
Previous scholarship demonstrates that contributions increase 
within open seat electoral contexts.61  The data reveal open seat 
candidates do not raise campaign contributions during non-election 
years.  Data in Table 3 represent total campaign contributions within 
open seat electoral contexts.  Parties, interest groups and other 
contributors are perhaps more willing to participate in open seat 
elections because the elections are perceived as competitive.  The data 
 
 61. According to election scholar Daniel Shea, “[o]pen-seat elections tend to offer a more 
even footing than those in which the incumbent wins, . . . many open seats are considered toss-ups.”  
Shea & Burton, supra note 26, at 31.  Jacobson feels that “[e]lections for open seats are typically 
much more competitive than those between incumbents and challengers.” JACOBSON 1980, supra 
note 42, at 106. 
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reveal the semi-partisan system becomes more competitive within open 
seat electoral contexts. 
 
Table 3: CONTRIBUTIONS RAISED BY CANDIDATES IN OPEN SEAT ELECTIONS 
 SWEENEY PFEIFFER COOK HAFFEY STRATTON BETTMAN BLACK OCONNOR 
1992   642,063  572,440             
1993                 
1994     518,943 288,920         
1995                 
1996         483,119  442,256     
1997                 
1998                 
1999                 
2000                 
2001                 
2002             1,300,410 1,777,617 
 
D.  Incumbent Contributions: Interest Groups, Individuals and Political 
Parties 
Despite the common perception that incumbent justices are 
disproportionately dependent on interest group contributions, Table 4 
and Figure 1 reveal that incumbents are not receiving a greater 
percentage of money from interest groups.  The data reveal that 
incumbents receive 51 percent of campaign contributions from 
individuals; interest group contributions represent 44 percent of 
campaign contributions; and political parties represent 5 percent of 
campaign contributions during the 1992-2002 elections.  The negligible 
5 percent contributed by political parties is surprisingly low considering 
political parties’ aggressive fundraising activities.  The low party amount 
may represent incumbents’ abilities to raise contributions from 
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 Table 4: Re-Election Year Contributions to Incumbents 
 
 Total Raised Groups Individuals Party 
D RESNICK 1994 $732,002 31% 52% 17% 
              
R DOUGLAS 1996 $441,582 40% 60% 0% 
              
D SWEENEY 1998 $536,554 46% 54% 0% 
              
R PFEIFER 1998 $575,847 46% 54% 0% 
              
R COOK 2000 $919,702 58% 33% 8% 
              
D RESNICK 2000 $484,574 58% 42% 0% 
              








Figure 1: Incumbent Percent of Total Election Year Dollars 
Raised from Political Parties, Interest Groups and Individual 
Contributions 
Incumbent Percent of Total Election Year Dollars Raised from 
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E.  Challenger Contributions: Interest Groups, Individuals and Political 
Parties 
The contribution patterns for challengers and incumbents are 
similar.  But challengers are more likely to receive contributions from 
interest groups and individuals.  Political parties, on the other hand, are 
the least likely contributors to challengers within the semi-partisan 
system.  The data in Table 5 represent challenger contributions during 
1994-2002 elections.  The data reveal interest group contributions 
represent 49 percent of challenger campaign contributions, individual 
contributions represent 36 percent of challenger campaign contributions 
and political party contributions represent 14 percent of challenger 
campaign contributions. 
 
Table 5: Election Year Contributions to Challengers 
  Total Raised Groups Individuals Party 
R HARPER 1994 $24,990 54% 12% 34% 
              
D SIKORA 1996 $34,803 62% 34% 3% 
              
R POWELL 1998 $260,322 42% 39% 19% 
              
D SUSTER 1998 $276,196 49% 51% 0% 
              
D BLACK 2000 $694,394 53% 47% 0% 
              
R ODONNELL 2000 $1,016,426 41% 26% 33% 
              
D BURNSIDE 2002 $1,193,733 43% 43% 14% 
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Figure 2: Challenger Percent of Total Election Year Dollars Raised from 
Political Parties, Interest Groups and Individual Contributions 
 
F.  Campaign Spending: Incumbent Categorized Expenditures 
Table 6 displays total expenditures by incumbents and the 
percentage of the vote that incumbents received.  Every incumbent won 
re-election during the 1994-2002 elections.  The expenditure data reveal 
that campaign costs did not escalate until the 2002 elections, 
contradicting the perception that the 2000 campaign increased campaign 
costs.  Incumbents during 1994-2002 spent an average of $670,000, and 
were re-elected with 60 percent of the vote. 
Categorized expenditures in Figure 3 reveal the percentages 
spent on various campaign services during 1994-2002 elections.  
Incumbents allocated 78 percent of their campaign budgets to media 
advertising, 13 percent to consultant services and the remaining 
expenditures to direct mail and staff.  Incumbent expenditure data reveal 
that Ohio Supreme Court elections are professionally conducted 
campaigns using professional campaign services, meaning that 
incumbent justices hire professional fundraising, speech writing, polling 
and media services.62 
 
 62. Election scholarship has discussed judicial campaigns’ increasing reliance on media and 
campaign consultants.  Shea argues campaign professionalism has created consultant-centered 
campaigns.  Shea & Burton, supra note 26, at 12.  He feels that consultant-centered campaigns are 
distinct by three characteristics: new players (professional consultants replaced party activists); new 
incentives (specialized skill within direct mail, strategy, media, fundraising); and new resources 
(ability to raise money outside party contributions).  Id.  According to Shea, “campaigns are now 
Challenger Percent of Total Election Year Dollars 
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Table 6: Incumbent Total Expenditures and Percentage of the Vote 
 INCUMBENTS Total Expenditures %Vote 
1994 RESNICK $543,017 59 
1996 DOUGLAS $366,557 66 
1998 SWEENEY $484,280 62 
1998 PFEIFFER $512,461 71 
2000 COOK $645,542 52 
2000 RESNICK $559,367 57 
2002 STRATTON $1,704,379 55 
AVERAGE  $687,943 60 
 
Figure 3: Incumbents Expenditures Categorized 












staffed by people who know the strategies, tactics, and art of political management, . . . everything 
from fund-raising activities, to direct mail, to television advertising, to grassroots activities is now 
coordinated by well paid campaign consulting firms.”  Id. 
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G. Campaign Spending: Challenger Categorized Expenditures 
Challenger expenditure data in Table 7 reveal that challengers’ 
campaign expenditures are escalating.  During the 1994 election, 
Democratic challenger Harper spent only $9,845.  Democratic 
challengers continued spending small amounts until the 2000 election 
where Democratic challenger Black outspent Republican incumbent 
Cook ($676,409 - $645,542); Black still lost the election.  Challengers 
during 1994-2002 spent an average $415,726 and received 
approximately 40 percent of the vote.  The significance here is that 
challenger expenditures are becoming more competitive.63 
Categorized expenditure data in Figure 4 reveal the percentages 
spent by challengers on campaign services.  Challengers allocated 52 
percent of their campaign budgets to media advertising, 14 percent to 
direct mail, 22 percent to campaign consultants and fundraising, 15 
percent to headquarters and staff and the remaining expenditures to 
travel expenses.  Challenger expenditure data reveal challenger 
campaigns are professionally conducted and increasingly reliant on 













 63. According to campaign finance scholar Gary Jacobson, “[t]he most important factor 
affecting how much money non-incumbents can raise is their perceived probability of winning.  
Sure losers do not attract campaign contributions. . . .  [C]andidates must convince the elites who 
provide campaign funds that they have a chance to win. . . .”  JACOBSON 1980, supra note 42, at 
105-6.  Jacobson argues: 
Another important variable, one that interacts strongly with the probability of election 
(as well as the availability of funds) is quality of the candidate . . . .  Good candidates 
attract financial support; the availability of money attracts good candidates.  The 
consequence is a triad of mutually reinforcing variables: quality of candidate, probability 
of victory, and availability of campaign funds. 
Id. at 106.  The current research demonstrates Jacobson’s theory: candidates are becoming more 
competitive because the candidates are perceived as winners, which increases contribution and 
expenditures levels. 
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Table 7: Challenger Total Expenditures and Percentage of the Vote 
 CHALLENGER Total Expenditures % Vote  
1994 HARPER $9,845 41 
1996 SIKORA $30,670 34 
1998 POWELL $158,961 38 
1998 SUSTER $248,306 29 
2000 BLACK $676,409 48 
2000 ODONNELL $619,594 43 
2002 BURNSIDE $1,166,298 45 













Direct Mail 14% 
Media  52% 
22
Akron Law Review, Vol. 38 [2005], Iss. 3, Art. 3
http://ideaexchange.uakron.edu/akronlawreview/vol38/iss3/3
MARION1.DOC 4/29/2005  10:01:51 AM 
2005] FINANCING OHIO SUPREME COURT ELECTIONS 589 
H.  Electoral Context and Candidate Quality 
Critics commonly argue election costs are escalating within the 
semi-partisan system.64  The data in Table 8 display aggregate election-
year expenditures.  The data reveal increased election costs have varied 
according to electoral context and candidate quality.  Incumbent contexts 
with weak challengers produce lower aggregate election-year 
expenditures; incumbent contexts with strong challengers produce 
higher aggregate election-year expenditures.  During the 1994 and 1996 
elections, challengers were non-competitive, spending less than 50 
percent of the incumbents’ total expenditures.  As a result, aggregate 
election year expenditures were low.  During the 2000 election, 
challenger quality improved, with challengers outspending incumbents.  
Furthermore, during the 2002 election, challenger competitiveness 
increased, as challengers spent 50 percent more than their incumbent 
counterparts. 
Aggregate election year expenditures also increase within open seat 
electoral contexts.  During the 1992 election, aggregate election-year 
expenditures increased as a result of candidate quality, though spending 
more than one’s opponent did not necessarily guarantee victory (e.g. 
Patton outspent Pfeifer and lost).  During the 2002 election, increased 
aggregate election-year expenditures reflected increased candidate 
competitiveness.  Election costs are escalating, but the costs are a 
consequence of increased candidate expenditures and increasingly well-
funded challengers. 65 
 
 64. See ABA REPORT, supra note 14, at 22. 
 65. The current research demonstrates that escalating costs vary according to electoral context 
and candidate quality.  The methodology within the current research relies on descriptive statistics 
using aggregate election expenditures within different electoral contexts.  The current approach 
differs from previous judicial selection literature by explaining the variation and increased levels of 
election spending. 
The question as to what methodology to employ is important for future research concerning 
judicial campaign finance.  Caution must be given as to comparing open seat and incumbent 
campaign contexts.  For example, comparing the costs of campaigning during the 1980s to current 
standards is misleading: the dollars are not adjusted for inflation, the dollars are compared across 
electoral contexts (i.e. open seats and incumbent contexts), and the dollars do not explain the 
increased professionalization of court elections.  See Goidel & Gross, supra note 42, at 142-45; 
Hojanacki & Baum, supra note 27, at 921.  Skim the reform literature and it does not take long to 
come across a comparison of money.  See supra notes 9-14 and accompanying text (discussing the 
reform literature).  Take for example, Bradley Link’s comment that, “[h]ere in Ohio, the campaign 
for the Chief Justice seat increased over $2.5 million dollars from $100 thousand in 1980. . . .”  
Link, supra note 13, (referring to an American Bar Association report on ‘Judicial Independence, 
Public Financing of Judicial Campaigns, available at http://www.abanet.org/ 
judind/pdf/commissionreport4-03.pdf).  See generally Jacobson, supra note 42; Green & Krasno, 
supra note 42; and Goidel & Gross, supra note 42 (research providing a summary of campaign 
finance measures and methods). 
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 $516,476 $650,145 $419,283 $310,976 $1,896,880 
1994 
RESNICK    







 $543,017 $9,845 $264,921 $173,229 $991,012 
1996 
DOUGLAS 







 $366,557 $30,670 $103,044 $378,354 $878,625 
1998 
SWEENEY 




( I ) 
SUSTER 
(C)  
 $484,280 $158,961 $512,461 $248,306 $1,404,008 
2000 
COOK 




( I ) 
ODONNELL 
(C)  
 $645,542 $676,409 $559,367 $619,594 $2,500,912 
2002 
STRATTON 







 $1,704,379 $1,166,298 $1,602,565 $1,306,396 $5,779,638 
 
 
Critics use aggregate data to compare costs associated with advocacy campaigns.  See, e.g., 
GOLDBERG & SANCHEZ, supra note 2, at 10.  Advocacy campaign costs appear to increase when 
looking generally at advocacy costs.  However, the comparisons do not account for electoral context 
and candidate quality.  Comparing advocacy campaigns within incumbent and open seat elections 
creates a contextual fallacy.  Future methods must account for the variation that exists within the 
semi-partisan system.  Generalizations without attention to election context create misunderstanding 
within the judicial selection debate. 
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IV.  EXPLANATORY VARIABLES AND DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS 
1982-2002 
The current research has used candidate political party affiliation, 
interest group endorsements, incumbency, quality and expenditures as 
explanatory variables within the semi-partisan elections.  The current 
research relies on descriptive statistics, but future research might model 
electoral outcomes using multivariate analysis.  With future research in 
mind, this short section provides descriptive statistics addressing 
electoral outcomes during the 1982-2002 elections. The list also 
provides relevant statistics concerning Ohio’s judicial selection debate. 
Political parties: of the twenty-six races for the Ohio Supreme 
Court since 1982, the Republican candidates won sixteen times or 62 
percent of the time. 
Interest group endorsements: of the twenty-six races for the Ohio 
Supreme Court since 1982, candidates who received AFSCME 
endorsements won fifteen times or 58 percent of the time. 
Ohio Bar Association ratings: of the twenty-six races for the Ohio 
Supreme Court, candidates that received higher bar association ratings 
won eleven times or 79 percent of the time.66 
Incumbency: of the nineteen incumbents seeking reelection for the 
Ohio Supreme Court since 1982, the incumbent candidate won 
seventeen times or 89 percent of the time. 
Semi-partisan selection method: of the nineteen incumbents 
seeking reelection for the Ohio Supreme Court since 1982, the election 
result was closer than 60:40 or 68 percent of the time. 
Open seats: of the seven open seats for the Ohio Supreme Court 
since 1982, the election result was closer than 60:40 or 86 percent of the 
time 
V.  DISCUSSION 
The current study is a descriptive analysis of campaign 
contributions and expenditures within Ohio’s semi-partisan system.  The 
data support previous scholarship concerning incumbency and political 
 
 66. According to the Ohio State Bar Association Rating method, judicial candidates are rated 
“Highly Qualified,” “Recommended,” and “Qualified, But Not Recommended.”  OSBA Announces 
Supreme Court Candidate Ratings for the November 2004 General Election, available at 
http://www.ohiobar.org/pubs/insideosba/?articleid=222 (last visited Apr. 16, 2004).  The superior 
rating of “Highly Qualified” is awarded to candidates receiving favorable votes from 75 percent of 
the commission members; the rating “Recommended” is awarded to candidates receiving at least 60 
percent of votes from the commission; and “Qualified, But Not Recommended” is awarded to 
candidates who fail to receive 60 percent of votes from commission members.  Id. 
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party effects: incumbents receive on average 60 percent of the vote,67 
and the semi-partisan system favors Republican candidates, who 
currently hold a 6:1 advantage on the court.68  The data contradict 
campaign finance concerns.  The results demonstrate the semi-partisan 
method does not place inappropriate fundraising demands on judicial 
candidates.69  Both incumbents and challengers allocate limited time 
toward fundraising in non-election years.70  Additionally, during an 
incumbent’s six-year term, he or she will spend roughly one year raising 
campaign contributions.71 
These data do not support the current understanding of candidate 
campaign finance; the campaign finance system does not discourage 
qualified judicial candidates.  These results indicate that challengers 
often raise competitive campaign contributions, outspend incumbents 
and lose elections.72  Additionally, judicial candidates’ contributions are 
not disproportionately obtained through interest group donors.73  Both 
incumbents and challengers raise the majority of contributions from 
individuals and interest groups.74  Both receive the least amount of 
campaign contributions from political parties.75 
Finally, campaign costs are increasing, but as a consequence of 
challenger competitiveness.  During the 1994-2002 elections, the 
average incumbent campaign cost $687,943;76 challengers’ campaigns 
cost an averaged $415,726.77  Recent campaigns have cost $1.5 
million.78  Nonetheless, the semi-partisan method continues to produce 
competitive elections despite the successes of incumbent candidates.79 
 
 67. See supra Table 6 and Figure 2. 
 68. See supra Table 4. 
 69. See supra Table 4 and Figure 1; Table 5 and Figure 2. 
 70. See supra Table 1 and Table 3. 
 71. See supra Table 4. 
 72. See supra Table 6 and Table 7. 
 73. See supra Table 4 and Figure 1; Table 5 and Figure 2. 
 74. Id. 
 75. Id. 
 76. See supra Table 4 (noting that incumbents receive 95 percent of their contributions from 
individuals and interest groups, while challengers receive 85 percent of their contributions from 
individuals and interest groups). 
 77. See supra Table 5 (illustrating that incumbents receive 5 percent of their contributions 
from political parties, where challengers receive 14 percent from political parties). 
 78. See supra Tables 4-7 (showing the expenditures for candidates for judicial office in the 
elections held since 2000). 
 79. See supra Table 6 and Table 7 (noting the percentages each candidate, whether an 
incumbent, challenger, or a candidate vying for an open seat, has garnered). 
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VI.  CONCLUSION 
The current research demonstrates the variation that exists within 
the semi-partisan system.  During the 1992-2002 elections, wide 
variations existed between incumbents’ and challengers’ contributions 
and expenditure patterns.  There are clear differences between 
Democrats and Republicans within the semi-partisan system: 
Republicans win under the Ohio semi-partisan system regardless of 
campaign spending.  This finding supports previous semi-partisan 
scholarship.  However, the data confirm that semi-partisan elections are 
predictive.  When explanatory variables are combined (particularly 
incumbency and partisanship), electoral outcomes make sense.  While 
the reform effort is quickly proceeding within Ohio,80 the empirical data 
necessary to support the changes has not kept pace.  The current research 
suggests approaching reform with data to support common assumptions 
concerning judicial campaign finance and judicial selection. 
Critics have offered numerous proposals that alter semi-partisan 
elections, but they may overstate the case for reform.  Those examining 
the data cannot claim that semi-partisan elections are not threatened by 
interest group money or that money undermines the judiciary.  However, 
the data do describe and explain how money operates within the semi-
partisan system.  Additionally, the data do not support the ABA’s 
characterization of judicial elections. 81  The semi-partisan system 
produces highly qualified candidates and increasingly competitive 
elections.  Finally, the ABA makes assertions about independent 
expenditures and issue advocacy.  These questions are beyond the data, 
but there are reasons to question their effects.  The precise effects of 
independent expenditures and issue advocacy have not been explained 
because data are lacking. 
 
 80. See supra note 21 and accompanying text (stating that Ohio is currently entertaining a bill 
to change the judicial selection process). 
 81. What is now occurring in Ohio is similar to the debate after Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1 
(1976).  Philosophic differences emerged within the post-Buckley research.  One side viewed 
campaign finance reform as a public good: this side argues for regulating speech within the First 
Amendment; contribution limits are seen as advancing an important governmental interest in 
preventing both the actual corruption threatened by large financial contributions and the eroding of 
public confidence in the electoral process through the appearance of corruption.  See generally 
Buckley, 424 U.S. 1 (1976); Federal Election Commission v. National Right to Work Committee, 
459 U.S. 197 (1982).  The other side views campaign finance reform as threatening speech rights 
within the First Amendment; regulations limit political speech and hinder the democratic process; 
regulating speech is seen to violate core political speech: “[T]he very purpose of the First 
Amendment is to preserve an uninhibited marketplace of ideas in which truth will ultimately 
prevail.”  See McConnell v. Federal Election Commission, 540 U.S. 93, 265 (2003) (Thomas, J. 
dissenting). 
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Those interested in campaign finance and judicial selection, 
regardless of their perspectives, will be challenged by recent changes in 
constitutional law.  Ohio’s semi-partisan system will be affected by the 
recent U.S. Supreme Court rulings in Republican Party of Minnesota v. 
White and McConnell v. Federal Election Commission.82  The ruling in 
White alters semi-partisan elections by removing ethical canons that 
restrict candidates’ campaign behavior; as a result, semi-partisan 
elections may become more politicized under the ruling.83  McConnell 
 
 82. See White, 536 U.S. 765; McConnell, 540 U.S. 93.  The U.S. Supreme Court held in 
Republican Party of Minn. v. White that the Minnesota Supreme Court’s canon on judicial conduct 
prohibiting judicial candidates from announcing disputed legal or political issues violated the First 
Amendment.  White, 536 U.S. at 788.  The Minnesota Supreme Court canon, the “announce clause,” 
unconstitutionally prescribed the context of judicial candidates speech during the course of the 
election.  Id.  The clause prohibited (1) judicial candidates from announcing views on “nonfanciful 
legal questions,” and (2) prohibited speech based on its content (e.g. speech about judicial 
qualifications).  Id.  The Court applied the strict scrutiny test, which requires respondents to prove 
the clause is narrowly tailored to serve a compelling state interest.  According to Justice Scalia, “the 
notion that the special context of electioneering justifies an abridgment of the right to speak out on 
disputed issues set our First Amendment jurisprudence on its head.  We have never allowed the 
government to prohibit candidates from communicating relevant information to voters during an 
election.”  Id. at 781. 
The U.S. Supreme Court held in McConnell v. Federal Election Commission that the 
Congressional Bipartisan Campaign Finance Reform Act (BCRA) regulating soft money and issue 
advocacy was constitutional under the First Amendment.  McConnell, 540 U.S. at 224.  The Court 
held the provisions advanced the important governmental interest in preventing both actual 
corruption and the appearance of corruption.  Id. at 154.  The Court applied the strict scrutiny test 
and argued the BCRA was narrowly tailored and served a compelling governmental interest in 
bringing soft money contributions and issue advocacy campaigns under the province of Federal 
Election Campaign Act (FECA) 1971.  Id. at 114-224. 
 83. The implications of White and the 2004 Ohio Supreme Court election are as follows: 
during the election, Cuyahoga County GOP Chairman James Trakas filed grievance charges with 
the Ohio Supreme Court’s Disciplinary Counsel, arguing Democratic candidate Judge William 
O’Neill’s campaign literature violated three provisions of the Ohio Code of Judicial Conduct: 
Canon 7(B)(3)(b) which provides that “after the day of the primary election, a judicial candidate 
shall not identify himself or herself in advertising as a member of or affiliated with a political 
party.” O’Neill v. Coughlan, No. 1:04CV1612 at 1 (N.D. Ohio Sept. 14, 2004) available at 
http://www.sconet.state.oh.us/Judicial_Candidates/fed_lit_canon7/Aldrich_Decision_091404.pdf.  
See also OHIO CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT, § 7(B)(3)(b) (2004) available at 
http://www.sconet.state.oh.us/Rules/conduct.  Canon 7(D)(2), which states that judicial campaign 
materials and ads may not “use the term ‘judge’ when a judge is a candidate for another judicial 
office and does not indicate the court on which the judge currently serves.”  Id. at § 7(D)(2).  Canon 
7(B)(1) requires that “judges and judicial candidates shall maintain the dignity appropriate to 
judicial office.” Id. at § 7(B)(1).  Judge O’Neill’s campaign literature identified his political party 
affiliation as Democrat, referenced his judicial experience as a judge for the Court of Appeals for 
the Eleventh District, and referenced his campaign theme “Money and Judges Don’t Mix.”  O’Neill, 
No. 1:04CV1612 at 2.  Judge O’Neill argued the canons violated judicial candidate’s First 
Amendment speech and expression rights under White.  Id. at 8-12. The United States District Court 
for the Northern District of Ohio provided preliminary injunctive relief allowing O’Neill’s 
campaign literature to proceed without sanction.  Id. at 23-24.  The District Court argued the canons 
facially violate constitutional speech and expression clauses under White.  Id. at 12, 23. 
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allows legislatures to regulate campaign conduct by regulating the 
timing of campaign ads prior to elections and allows legislatures to write 
disclosure laws regulating independent expenditures and issue 
advocacy.84  These cases provide the legal and analytical framework for 
future challenges to the semi-partisan system. 
Elections, although imperfect, provide a means of democratic 
accountability; policy change and representation; and reflect evolving 
issue concerns.  The semi-partisan method occupies a unique place 
within Ohio’s political culture and is representative of Ohio’s 
competitive politics.  Future reforms should recognize Ohio’s political 
culture and competitiveness, strengthen semi-partisan elections and 
secure judicial choice. 
 
 
 84. See McConnell, 540 U.S. at 219-23. 
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